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On a spectrum from the polar extreme of generality to the
opposite pole of specificity, "What should warnings say?" is near
the extreme in its degree of generality. A question phrased this
way invites a correspondingly generic response. Such a response
is not very useful to the trial judge and lawyers who regularly
must fashion clear explanations on the law of warning defect for
layperson juries. As used here, this question is not intended as a
signal inviting just any kind of response that might be acceptable
under the mores of casual conversation. It is a more serious
request for a very direct and substantive response. For clarifica-
tion, consider these two further variations upon it:
What does the law say warnings should say?
What legal consequences follow if warnings do not say what
the law says they should say?
These questions are illustrative of the issues raised in the legal
consideration of warnings and their sufficiency. The aim of this
Article is to provide legal professionals with guidance on how to
frame these issues.
INTRODUCTION
What should product warnings say?
When you hear that question, and that question alone,
what do you understand it to ask? Your answer probably
depends on whether you are a lawyer, judge, law professor,
law student, corporate executive, professional expert witness,
potential claimant, or an impartially interested citizen, if
such a person truly exists. A person asking the question
might intend it as a simple policy question: "What should
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warnings say?" Even so, probably few, if any, persons in
these categories would take the question that way.
Conversations are seldom governed by a ground rule that
questions are to be taken literally, and are to be answered
forthrightly. In the mores of our social conversations, it is
usually understood that one person's question serves as a
mere signal for another person to speak. The next speaker is
more likely to deflect the conversation than to answer the
question.
This Article takes the opening question seriously. A central
objective of the Article is to explore ways of doing two impor-
tant things: first, sharpening how judges and lawyers state
the questions of fact a jury must answer in a particular case;
and second, sharpening the questions of law that the trial
judge must answer before being able to frame with precision
the questions of fact that the jury must answer. Many of
these questions of law are unanswered in the traditional
sources of legal authority (principally constitutions, statutes,
and precedents). This Article does not purport to resolve
these unanswered questions or even to make recommenda-
tions about the answers to all of them. Rather, the Article
proposes ways all legal professionals may go about defining
the relevant questions.
In this process, questions that belong at various locations
on the generality-specificity spectrum will be considered. It is
important always to be clear about what kind of question we
are considering (law or fact, general or specific), and to be
clear about precisely what question or questions we are con-
sidering at each moment.
Part I of this Article centers primarily on one of the most
useful methods of framing precisely all material factual ques-
tions: consultation -between the trial judge and trial lawyers
about interrogatories to the jury. Part II addresses more
general issues of law, policy, and fact that illumine the pre-
cise choices that must be made before the precise factual
questions can be defined. Part III brings together the differ-
ent perspectives from Parts I and II in relation to a set of
illustrative issues. Part IV carries the exploration one step
further, integrating this Article's discussion into a provisional
and incomplete jury charge that explains to jurors how the
law defines the factual questions they must answer. It bears
emphasis that the draft is incomplete because the law is
unsettled. Like this provisional charge, the authoritative
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sources of law do not contain a clear explanation of exactly
what we mean by such words and phrases as "design," "warn-
ings," "defect," "unreasonably dangerous," "cost," "benefit,"
"utility," "risk," "burden," "probability," and "magnitude of
loss."
I. FRAMING THE QUESTIONS TO BE
ANSWERED WITH PRECISION
When a question about law and legal proceedings is to be
taken seriously, not just as a signal for another person to
speak, and when the answer is to be forthright, the framing
of the question dictates the relevance of any response. When
such questions and responses occur during courtroom pro-
ceedings, the answer to the legal questions that the trial
judge states in the form of an order or ruling defines the
factual issues of the case. The judge also sets boundaries on
the evidence that the parties may present in support of their
respective factual contentions.
A skillfully framed question, about either law or fact, dra-
matically limits the range of plausible answers. Indeed, a
skillful advocate can frame a question about law in a brief or
in oral argument so that it may virtually compel the response
that the advocate desires, because only one among all possi-
ble answers can be defended on a reasoned basis. As stated
in an aphorism that is part of the lore of American trial
lawyers, "Let me frame the question, and I will win the argu-
ment."
This Article, instead of discussing that kind of manipula-
tive framing of questions, attempts to state, in the most
neutral terms possible, each question of law that it considers.
The objective is to focus on developing a good understanding
of (1) the origins of the law of products liability regarding
warning issues (from where it came), (2) the present status of
products liability law (what can be stated as settled law and
what questions are unsettled), and (3) to what destination
observable trends may be pointing.
The most promising approach to this kind of clarification, at
least as to issues of the present and the future, is a hands-on
exercise in legal drafting. We should aim for drafting precise
questions (each question to be answered YES or NO) that
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might be put to a jury in a products liability case involving a
difficult and debatable warning issue. As a particularized
context for this drafting exercise, I will use a hypothetical case
that is not entirely imaginary. Imagination has served only to
give the parties different names and to simplify the fact
situation to make it more manageable for discussion.
THE CASE OF THE EXPLODING MOTOR GENERATOR UNIT:
GREER V. POWER ENGINEERING Co.
The plaintiff Greer was a skilled technician employed by
Consult, Inc., a consulting firm hired to test a motor generator
unit during the unit's installation by Power Engineering Co.
Power Engineering was doing the work under contract with a
corporate entity that owned and expected to operate the power
plant where the unit was being installed. Greer's employer,
Consult, Inc., had a contract with the owner-entity to do the
testing necessary before Power Engineering could receive the
final payment under its installation contract.
The motor generator unit exploded while the plaintiff Greer
was testing it just after Power Engineering installed it. The
plaintiff suffered severe electrical burns.
The nature of the questions proposed for submission to the
jury is revealed in three draft proposed verdict forms, pre-
sented below.' If one of these proposals becomes the verdict
form used at trial, the court would explain it to the jury in the
court's charge to the jury.
Beyond clarifying the meaning of ambiguous legal jargon, a
trial judge must make choices regarding the content of jury
instructions for several reasons: first, because products liability
law differs between states; second, because differences may
exist between state law and possibly preemptive federal law;
and third, because in many respects we cannot now know
exactly what the law is, regardless of its sources.
The first proposed verdict form is "designed" (without "de-
fect," I hope) for a jurisdiction like Massachusetts that uses
"breach of warranty" terminology for strict liability claims,2
1. A provisional and incomplete draft proposed charge to the jury is presented
in Part IV of this Article.
2. See Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968-69 (Mass. 1978) (comparing
Massachusetts' warranty liability to liability under section 402A of the Restatement
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applies comparative negligence principles to negligence-based
products liability claims,3 and applies a version of voluntary
assumption-of-known-risk to the breach-of-warranty claims.4
The last of these characteristics is explained in Correia v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,' the case to which Massachusetts
professionals refer when they speak of the "Correia defense."'
This draft verdict form also uses a type of question on
damages that is appropriate only for a jurisdiction like Mas-
sachusetts that has a prejudgment interest statute allowing
interest on damages for economic losses from the date the civil
action was filed.7
The second proposed verdict form is for a more common kind
of jurisdiction, one that uses negligence and strict liability
terminology, applies comparative negligence principles to
negligence claims, and allows no reduction of recovery on strict
liability grounds because of plaintiff fault.
8
The third proposed verdict form is for a jurisdiction that
accepts the recommendation of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability for a functional submission.'
All three proposed verdict forms leave some hard questions
of law to be resolved by the trial judge in the instructions to
the jury. Any hard legal questions left unanswered by the trial
judge are left to the jury by default, except to the very limited
extent that an appellate court might step in to override a jury
verdict on a mixed question of law and fact. This is simply an
inevitable consequence of the nature of a jury case, regardless
of the intent of the trial judge and trial lawyers.
(Second)); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 95, 97 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing warranty theories and other approaches to
products liability).
3. Cf KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 102 (discussing the use of contributory
negligence in products liability actions).
4. See Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Mass.
1983) ("When a user unreasonably proceeds to use a product which he knows to be
defective and dangerous, he violates [the duty to act reasonably with respect to that
product] and relinquishes the protection of the law.").
5. 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983).
6. See supra Part IV.
7. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 231, § 6B (1994) (allowing prejudgment interest at
the rate of 12% per year).
8. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (pio-
neering the use of strict liability in products liability); see also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 2, §§ 96, 98, 102. See generally David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict
Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980) (discussing various strict liability
systems).
9. See infra pp. 379-80.
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Before discussing the verdict forms, I state for your consid-
eration the following hypothesis: The third proposed verdict
form and charge-the functional submission proposed by the
Restatement (Third)-leaves more unanswered questions than
does either the first or the second proposed verdict form and
charge. Because judges will tend to leave some of these hard
questions still unanswered in the verdict form and charge, the
practical effect will be to leave more decisionmaking authority
to the jury-including decisionmaking authority over the policy
question about what the law on warnings should be.
That is the hypothesis I ask you to consider, as a means of
coming to forthright answers to the questions I stated at the
outset-including the policy question about what the law
should be.
To clarify what the hypothesis does and does not state, I add
that I am not suggesting that the drafters of the functional
approach of the American Law Institute (ALI), and those
persons in the Institute Council and Membership who support-
ed this approach, meant to give juries more discretion over
basic policy questions about the scope of strict liability. Indeed,
from observing the ALI process as a member of the Institute
and an adviser to the Reporters, I would infer that their
purpose was to limit the scope of liability and, as a means to
that end, to limit the scope of jury discretion. The hypothesis
I ask you to examine concerns not the intended effect but
rather the practical effect that this functional approach is
likely to have as it is implemented by human beings who are
genuinely committed to performing their respective functions
in the administration of justice. This hypothesis concerns law
in action.
As explained above, this draft verdict form for negligence and
breach of warranty is a suggestion of one of the many possible
choices that a trial judge and trial lawyers might consider for
the phrasing of the factual questions that the trial judge would
instruct the jury to answer in the hypothetical case stated
above.
372
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PROPOSED VERDICT FORMFOR CLAIMS OF
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF WARRANTY
DRAFT VERDICT FORM ONE
1(a). Was Power Engineering Co. negligent in relation to
the design of the motor generator unit that the plaintiff was
testing when he was injured?
-YES NO
1(b). If YES, was Power Engineering Co.'s negligence in
this respect a proximate cause of the injury?
_____YES _ NO
2(a). Was Power Engineering Co. negligent in relation to
the warnings provided with the motor generator unit the
plaintiff was testing when he was injured?
-YES ___NO
2(b). If YES, was Power Engineering Co.'s negligence in
this respect a proximate cause of the injury?
-YES ___NO
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO ONE OR BOTH OF 1(b) AND
2(b), ANSWER QUESTION 3. OTHERWISE, SKIP QUESTION
3.
3. Do you find that plaintiff Greer was negligent and that
his negligence was a proximate cause contributing to his
injury?
-YES __NO
If YES, then taking the negligence of Power Engineering Co.
and Greer as 100%, what percentage of negligence do you
attribute to each party? Answer in percentages that total 100%.
Percentage of negligence of defendant Power
Engineering Co. %
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Percentage of negligence
of plaintiff Greer %
TOTAL % (100%)
4(a). Do you find a breach by Power Engineering Co. of the
implied warranty of fitness for its intended purpose of the
design of the motor generator unit plaintiff was testing when
he was injured?
-YES NO
4(b). Do you find a breach by Power Engineering Co. of the
implied warranty of fitness for their intended purpose of the
warnings provided with the motor generator unit plaintiff was
testing when he was injured?
-YES NO
IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO BOTH 4(a) AND 4(b), SKIP TO
QUESTION 5. OTHERWISE, READ THE INSTRUCTIONS
FOR 4(c), 4(d), 4(e), AND 4(f).
ANSWER 4(c) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO 4(a).
4(c). Did plaintiff know of the defect in the motor gener-
ator's design, was he also aware of the danger arising from the
defect, and did he nevertheless proceed unreasonably with his
testing of the motor generator unit on the date of his injury?
-YES NO
ANSWER 4(d) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO 4(b).
4(d). Did plaintiff know of the defect in warnings, was he
also aware of the danger arising from the defect, and did he
nevertheless proceed unreasonably with his testing of the
motor generator unit on the date of his injury?
-YES NO
ANSWER 4(e) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO 4(c).
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4(e). Was Power Engineering Co.'s breach of warranty as
to design a proximate cause of the injury?
--- YES NO
ANSWER 4(f) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO 4(d).
4(f). Was Power Engineering Co.'s breach of warranty as
to warnings a proximate cause of the injury?
YES NO
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO ONE OR MORE OF 1(b), 2(b),
4(e), AND 4(f), ANSWER QUESTION 5. OTHERWISE, SKIP
QUESTION 5.
DAMAGES
5. What amount of money would fairly and reasonably
compensate plaintiff Greer in full for the harms or losses, if
any, of each of the following types, that you find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence were proximately caused by the neg-
ligence or breach of warranty of Power Engineering? Your
answers to questions (a), (b), (c), and (d) are to be stated in
terms of discounted value as of [the date this
civil action was filed].
This question concerns the amount required for fair and
reasonable compensation in full. Do not reduce your findings
because of a percentage of negligence, if any, you have found
in answering Question 3.
ECONOMIC DAMAGES:
(a) Loss of earning capacity,
if any, up to the date of
your verdict $
(b) Loss of earning capacity,
if any, in the future $
(c) Reasonable and necessary
expenses of treatment, if
any, up to the date of
your verdict $
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(d) Reasonable and necessary
expenses of treatment, if
any, in the future $
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
(e) Noneconomic damages, if
any, for physical injury,
pain and suffering, and
emotional distress, whether
in the past or in the future $
Date Foreperson
PROPOSED VERDICT FORM FOR
CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENCE AND DEFECT
DRAFT VERDICT FORM TWO
1(a). Was Power Engineering Co. negligent in relation to
the design of the motor generator unit that the plaintiff was
testing when he was injured?
YES NO
1(b). If YES, was Power Engineering Co.'s negligence in
this respect a proximate cause of the injury?
__YES __.NO
2(a). Was Power Engineering Co. negligent in relation to
the warnings provided with the motor generator unit the
plaintiff was testing when he was injured?
-YES NO
2(b). If YES, was Power Engineering Co.'s negligence in
this respect a proximate cause of the injury?
YES NO
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IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO ONE OR BOTH OF 1(b) AND
2(b), ANSWER QUESTION 3. OTHERWISE, SKIP QUESTION
3.
3. Do you find that plaintiff was negligent and that his
negligence was a proximate cause contributing to his injury?
-YES NO
If YES, then taking the negligence of Power Engineering
Co. and Greer as 100%, what percentage of negligence do
you attribute to each party? Answer in percentages that
total 100%.
Percentage of negligence of defendant Power
Engineering Co. _ %
Percentage of negligence
of plaintiff Greer %
TOTAL % (100%)
4(a). Was there a defect in the design of the motor gen-
erator unit the plaintiff was testing when he was injured?
-YES NO
4(b). Was there a defect in warnings provided with the
motor generator unit plaintiff was testing when he was in-
jured?
-YES NO
IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO BOTH 4(a) AND 4(b), SKIP TO
QUESTION 5. OTHERWISE, READ THE INSTRUCTIONS
FOR 4(c) AND 4(d).
ANSWER 4(c) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO 4(a).
4(c). Was the defect in design a proximate cause of the
injury?
-YES -NO
ANSWER 4(d) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO 4(b).
378 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:2&3
4(d). Was the defect in warnings a proximate cause of the
injury?
-YES NO
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO ONE OR MORE OF 1(b), 2(b),
4(c), AND 4(d), ANSWER QUESTION 5. OTHERWISE, SKIP
QUESTION 5.
5. What amount of money would fairly and reasonably
compensate plaintiff in full for the harms or losses, if any, of
each of the following types, that you find by a preponderance
of the evidence were proximately caused by the negligence of
Power Engineering Co. or defect of the motor generator unit?
Your answers to questions (a), (b), (c), and (d) are to be stated
in terms of discounted value as of [the date
this civil action was filed] [the date of your verdict].
This question concerns the amount required for fair and
reasonable compensation in full. Do not reduce your findings
because of a percentage of negligence, if any, you have found
in answering Question 3.
ECONOMIC DAMAGES:
(a) Loss of earning capacity,
if any, up to the date of
your verdict $
(b) Loss of earning capacity,
if any, in the future $
(c) Reasonable and necessary
expenses of treatment, if
any, up to the date of
your verdict $
(d) Reasonable and necessary
expenses of treatment, if
any, in the future $
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NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
(e) Noneconomic damages, if
any, for physical injury,
pain and suffering, and
emotional distress, whether
in the past or in the future $
Date Foreperson
PROPOSED VERDICT FORM FOR
A FUNCTIONAL SUBMISSION
DRAFT VERDICT FORM THREE
1(a). Did the motor generator unit plaintiff was testing at
the time of his injury have a defect of design?
-YES NO
1(b). If YES, was the defect of design a proximate cause
of the injury?
-YES NO
2(a). Did the motor generator unit plaintiff was testing at
the time of his injury have a defect in relation to warnings?
-YES NO
2(b). If YES, was the defect in warnings a proximate cause
of the injury?
-YES NO
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO ONE OR BOTH OF 1(b) AND
2(b), ANSWER QUESTION 3. OTHERWISE, SKIP QUESTION
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3. What amount of money would fairly and reasonably
compensate plaintiff Greer in full for the harms or losses, if
any, of each of the following types, that you find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence were proximately caused by defect of
the motor generator unit? Your answers to questions (a), (b),
(c), and (d) are to be stated in terms of discounted value as of
[the date this Civil Action was filed] [the
date of your verdict].
ECONOMIC DAMAGES:
(a) Loss of earning capacity,
if any, up to the date of
your verdict $
(b) Loss of earning capacity,
if any, in the future $
(c) Reasonable and necessary
expenses of treatment, if
any, up to the date of
your verdict $
(d) Reasonable and necessary
expenses of treatment, if
any, in the future $
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
(e) Noneconomic damages, if
any, for physical injury,
pain and suffering, and
emotional distress, whether
in the past or in the future $
Date Foreperson
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II. LAw, POLICY, AND FACT
Each of the three alternative proposed verdict forms for the
hypothetical case of Greer v. Power Engineering Co. purports
to submit questions of fact to the jury. Which of the proposed
verdict forms, or variation thereof, does the law support? In
order to determine which comes closest to being supported by
the law of any particular state, we will need to know the
answers to some questions of law.
It is part of the tradition of professionals in law to talk about
issues of law and issues of fact as if they were easily separable.
In reality, however, as explained below, many of the questions
we submit to a jury on a verdict form, or by way of a charge to
the jury explaining questions they must answer to arrive at a
"general verdict," concern mixed-legal-factual issues.
This hyphenated term, mixed-legal-factual issues, is not part
of settled terminology in use among professionals in law, so I
pause to explain the meaning of the phrase as I use it here. I
do not use it to describe that relatively uncomplicated kind of
test for legal accountability that applies when a case involves
both genuine legal disputes and genuine factual disputes.
Instead, I am referring to the kind of case that has some
central issue, or worse still, more than one such issue, in which
legal and factual elements are interwoven. From one perspec-
tive the interwoven issue looks like a legal issue to be decided
as legal issues are decided. From another perspective it looks
like a factual issue to be decided as factual issues are decided
(and that ordinarily means by a jury, of course). Neither. of
these appearances is exactly correct, or incorrect.
Describing this kind of issue another way, one may say the
legal and factual elements are so closely woven together that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate them. Only a person
who has the benefit of legal training would even try to think
about the legal issue separately from thinking about the
factual issue, or vice versa. This isolate-each-issue method of
thinking is, however, an essential part of what we legal profes-
sionals are committed to attempting. This is true even for those
among us who believe in eventually integrating our earlier
separated thoughts.
One of the simpler examples of a mixed-legal-factual question
is what we traditionally call an issue of cause--or as legal
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professionals are wont to say, that less complex part of "proxi-
mate" or "legal" causation commonly referred to as "cause-in-
fact."10
Strictly stated, the only "in-fact" part of the question is what
happened: what was the historical event? To answer the
"cause-in-fact" inquiry, we compare what did happen (if we can
make a reasonably reliable "finding" about that historical fact)
with a hypothetical contrary-to-fact so-called "finding" about
what would have happened "but-for" the conduct that the
claimants say caused the historical event." And, of course, we
are talking about a cause--one of many causes-never about
the cause in any but a legal sense. So, causation-in-fact in
litigation is always a mixed-legal-factual issue.
A "proximate cause," or "legal cause," issue is a somewhat
more complex mixture. Under the concept of "proximate cause,"
public policy considerations may either limit or expand the
scope of liability to less or more than all of the things the law
says were caused-in-fact by the conduct of some actor (here, the
marketer). 2 The "proximate cause" issue is even more complex.
It is a mixed-legal-factual-policy issue.
In products liability law, the issue of causal connection is
present not only with respect to conduct and harm but also
with respect to some product characteristic and harm. The
relevant characteristic is commonly called a "defect." Great
controversy exists about the precise meaning of defect, but it
remains true that the concept, however it may be defined,
concerns a characteristic of the product. Thus, we have a
mixed-legal-policy-factual issue regarding the connection
between a product characteristic (perhaps also called a "defect")
and a harm.
We have learned to live with causation issues of all kinds
tolerably well in most kinds of cases involving only one or a
few claimants and only one or a few defendants. The causation
issue may become more troublesome in products liability
litigation, however. One reason is the problem of so-called
10. See Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L.
REV. 543, 550-51 (1962); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 60, 60-61 (1956); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 41 (providing a general
discussion on causation-in-fact). See generally H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORI , CAUSATION
IN THE LAW 100-02 (1985) (discussing factual issues related to causation).
11. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 41, at 265.
12. See id. § 42 (listing factors and approaches that define the scope of proximate
cause).
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"categorical liability." That is, when the alleged defect is not
distinctive to a single product unit because of some error in the
manufacturing process, in the post-manufacture handling, or
during the chain of custody to the user, but instead is charac-
teristic of large numbers of units that were marketed widely
over the country or the world, the mix of legal elements (in-
cluding policy choices) and factual elements involves intertwin-
ing in a much more complex way.
A second reason for the complex nature of products liability
causation can be found in the problems associated with warn-
ings for the different kinds of users in all the different contexts
of use. Here, too, the legal elements (including policy choices)
and factual elements are intertwined in a much more intricate
and complicated way.
In short, the warning issue in products liability cases is an
especially complex mixed-legal-policy-factual issue. As ex-
plained below, however, the ALI has chosen not to probe the
depths of this area of complexity. One factor weighing in favor
of the ALI's choice is that the ALI product is a "Restatement;"
because present statutes and precedents do not plumb the
depths of this mixed-legal-policy-factual complex, there is not
much law on this topic that can be restated. This result howev-
er, is not a solution because trial judges and trial lawyers,
whose needs grow with every increase in the number and
complexity of the cases they handle, receive little help from
existing precedents and could benefit greatly from the help the
ALI might provide.
My understanding of the tone of the ALI Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability is that it encourages courts to
exercise more control over cases to limit expansion of the scope
of products liability. 13 Neither the black letter provisions nor
the comments, however, provide judges adequate guidance on
how to accomplish that goal in their jury instructions. Although
the judiciary still can override errant verdicts on appeal or
order judgments as a matter of law before or after such ver-
dicts, their actions must be performed on a reasoned basis and
must be explained candidly and forthrightly. Thus, as matters
now stand, courts and lawyers are left with little guidance on
how to influence the scope of products liability.
13. Again, my understanding is from the perspective of a member-observer and
reader of the draft ALI Restatement (Third) as it now exists.
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These are issues that remain for consideration by legal
professionals and interested citizens, regardless of the choices
made in federal and state law about whether the general
structure of the trial of a warnings case will follow one of the
three models illustrated in the proposed jury verdict forms.
These three illustrative verdict forms by no means exhaust
the range of possibilities. They do, however, illustrate three
general and preliminary methods by which a trial judge may
express whether the law that is to be applied is like that of
Massachusetts (Form One), like that of many other states
(Form Two), or like that proposed in the Restatement (Third)
(Form Three). This choice, however, is only a beginning. Either
through careful refinement of the questions in the verdict form,
or through detailed jury instructions that explain the questions
in the verdict form, the trial judge must either address and re-
solve every unsettled mixed-legal-factual-policy question about
the scope of products liability relevant to the case, or leave
some or all of these questions to unguided jury discretion. The
latter choice, in practical effect, surrenders lawmaking func-
tions to a jury. I do not believe that to be the intent of the ALI
drafters, the ALI council, or the ALI membership, in approving
the Restatement (Third); however, their unmanifested intent
is unexplained and unknown to juries. Thus, it will not control
verdicts. The outcome of cases that are virtually alike in all
material respects will be left to unexplained variant verdicts
until some concerned legislature (federal or state) answers the
questions, or, absent legislation, some concerned and embold-
ened trial or appellate court answers them in a way clear
enough for a jury to understand and applies these answers to
cases at trial. A continuing default by courts, as well as legisla-
tures, is, I submit, a failure to deliver evenhanded treatment
of like cases.
As a trial judge, I would have welcomed the help of the
American Law Institute in the judiciary's ongoing efforts to
develop wise and fair answers to these important questions.
Courts must now do as well as they can without that help.
III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE SET OF ISSUES
The unanswered mixed-legal-policy-factual issues that
surround questions of warning defect in products liability
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litigation are too numerous and varied for treatment in this
Article. The most it is possible to do here is to select some
illustrative issues for closer examination.
For illustration, this Article comments briefly on a set of
problems growing out of what I believe to be implicit but
unexplained assumptions-a set of problems common to
comparisons among costs, benefits, utility, risk, harm, proba-
bility of loss, burden, and the like. Consider, for example, three
comparisons that might influence one's views on how a trial
judge should instruct a jury on whether the manufacturer of
a product line is subject to liability for all or part of a loss that
the product line helped to cause. What should the trial judge
say about what the law in some jurisdiction now is, or is to be,
if the law is not yet clearly settled? A more difficult question
is presented when one asks what a trial judge should say to a
jury on this subject, if the law is now unsettled with no predict-
able future course.
I gratefully acknowledge that in formulating these three
comparisons and the explanation below, I have borrowed freely
from Professor Owen's remarks at the March 1996 Colloquy on
Products Liability at the University of Michigan, and from his
sharp focus on framing a standard that explains clearly what
it is that causes us to say a product is unreasonably danger-
ous.
14
The Article discusses three comparisons immediately below:
1. COST-BENEFIT
Is the COST greater than the BENEFIT?
2. RISK-UTILITY
Is the RISK greater than the UTILITY?
3. B < PL
15
Is the BURDEN less than the
PROBABILITY OF THE INJURY?
The term "RISK" is ordinarily used to mean something quite
different from "COST." "UTILITY" is ordinarily used, in a
14. See David G. Owen, Remarks at the Colloquy on Products Liability: Compre-
hensive Discussions on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 201-06
(Mar. 23, 1996) (transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
15. This third comparison derives from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (finding negligence to
exist if B < PL, B being the burden or cost of avoiding accidental loss, P being the
increase in probability of loss, and L being the probable magnitude of loss).
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nontechnical sense, to mean something at least a bit different
from "BENEFIT." Thus, the first two comparisons differ.
Also, "RISK" is often used to mean "probability of losses"
times "mean magnitude of losses"-or "PL" in Learned Hand's
metaphor. 6 Hand, however, compared PL with BURDEN (B).
I submit that a careful reading of his Carroll Towing opinion, 7
with sensitivity to the context in which it was written, supports
the interpretation that he was using the term "BURDEN" in
the sense of cost of avoiding (or perhaps reducing) losses..That
comparison is a very different metaphor from the "COST-
BENEFIT" metaphor in the sense stated below.
Taking, as a point of beginning, some figures that were used
in this Symposium,'" assume a product line that the manufac-
turer sells in the marketplace for a total of $8 billion (gross).
Assume that manufacturing and marketing costs are $4 billion.
Assume that the calculus of risk for this product, lacking a
specified kind of safety feature, is that RISK = $3 billion.
If we treat RISK as part of the COST of the product line (a
way of thinking consistent with the objective of making the
product line "pay its way"), the total COST is $7 billion. If we
also take the $8 billion that buyers were willing to pay in the
market as a surrogate for BENEFIT (that is, this is the worth
of all the tangible and intangible elements of BENEFIT as
evaluated by all buyers as a group) then the product line has
more BENEFIT than COST. Stated in tabular form, here is the
calculus:
$4 billion for manufacturing cost
+ $3 billion for RISK
$7 billion total COST
+ $1 billion PROFIT
$8 billion TOTAL (also the amount of gross sales, or
BENEFIT)
If the law says this product line is not defective and that the
manufacturer is not legally responsible for any part of the
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Owen, supra note 14, at 200-02 (referring to charts used in his discussion
of cost-benefit analysis).
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RISK, then RISK is not placed on the scales at all and the
manufacturer has a $4 billion profit. The victims bear all of the
$3 billion RISK. They "subsidize" the manufacturer to the
extent of $3 billion, unless buyers and competitors become well
enough informed to take part of the "subsidy" away from the
manufacturer and appropriate it to themselves, still leaving the
victims uncompensated "subsidizers." Stated in tabular form,
here is the calculus:
$4 billion manufacturing and market cost
+ $0 responsibility for RISK
$4 billion total COST
+ $4 billion PROFIT
$8 billion TOTAL (also the amount of gross sales, or
BENEFIT)
Is it sensible to use "gross sales" as a surrogate measure of
BENEFIT? Although the notion that thousands or millions of
buyers would ever be truly "informed" is a contrary-to-fact
fiction, arguments are being advanced that the law of some
states presumes them to be informed, and that buying is
presumed consent to "assume" the RISK both for themselves
and for the victims of their use of the product. 9 I do not believe
this is a correct reading of the scattering of judicial opinions
that have anything at all to say on this subject.2" Nor do I
believe tort reform statutes have made this a prevailing rule,
even if one or more statutes may be read to say this for a
particular state or states-a point I assume arguendo in order
to move on to the more important issues at stake in thinking
about the extent to which the law does or should support the
idea that a "product pays its way." Thus, I do not believe it
would be correct for me, as a trial judge, to instruct a jury that
the law includes a statement that buyers generally, or the
buyers of a particular product, are presumed to be "informed"
about "subsidizing" product risks or that the injured person
19. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Remarks at the Colloquy on Products Liability: Com-
prehensive Discussions on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 20-25
(Mar. 23, 1996) (transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
20. See infra pp. 392-98.
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whose case is on trial, or "consumers" and injured persons gen-
erally, are presumed to have "consented to" or "assumed" the
"risk" of suffering an injury such as happened to the injured
person now at trial. Nevertheless, I recognize that gross sales
of a product line may be useful as a very rough estimate of an
evaluation of benefit, and one that is ready without all the
effort and resources that would be required to determine what
other calculus might provide a better estimate. Thus, we may
use gross sales as a rough-and-ready estimate of BENEFIT.
Now assume that a safety feature is proposed for addition to
the product. Assume that the evaluation of the decisionmaker,
whoever that may be, is that this safety feature would cut
RISK from $3 billion to $1 billion. Also assume that adding the
safety feature would add $1 billion to manufacturing costs.
If the manufacturer is still not responsible for any part of
RISK, it has a disincentive to add the safety feature. The
manufacturing cost of adding that feature would reduce its
profit by $1 billion, from $4 billion to $3 billion. The reduced
RISK would have no bearing on the manufacturer's profit.
If, on the other hand, the manufacturer is responsible for all
of the RISK in both cases, then to make the comparison we
must add, on the COST side, $1 billion more manufacturing
cost, and we change the RISK figure on the COST side from $3
billion to $1 billion. Thus, the manufacturer's PROFIT will
increase from $1 billion to $2 billion with the addition of the
safety feature (the net of saving $2 billion of RISK by adding
$1 billion manufacturing costs). With the RISK burden, the
manufacturer has an economic incentive to produce and sell
the safer product. Stated in tabular form, here is the calculus:
$4 billion manufacturing and market costs (old
method)
$1 billion added manufacturing and market costs
with safety feature
+ $1 billion RISK with safety feature
$6 billion total COST
+ $2 billion PROFIT
$8 billion TOTAL (also the amount of gross sales, or
BENEFIT)
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This way of envisioning the comparison always places RISK
on the COST side, along with the costs of manufacturing. The
saving of lives (stated as a recalculated RISK) shows up as a
reduced COST rather than an added BENEFIT. If, instead of
looking at the comparison this way, we treat saving lives as
part of the BENEFIT, the buyers' willingness to pay $8 billion
could no longer be used as a surrogate for the evaluation of
BENEFIT.
This is barely an introduction, but I hope it is enough to
illustrate this suggested approach to comparisons. Of course,
one who accepts this approach will discover many other im-
plications for the details of the comparisons. For example, a
safety feature may make the product less attractive to some
buyers. Thus, the BENEFIT as measured by what buyers will
pay in the marketplace might be reduced. If in the example
given, we add the assumption that BENEFIT is reduced by
$1.5 billion to $6.5 billion, the incentives would be shifted.
Trying to bring together in one equation (or formula, or
weighing) the COST-BENEFIT comparison and Learned
Hand's comparison is mixing metaphors. Bringing these
different perspectives to bear is sensible, but trying to inte-
grate them into one metaphor is probably not an objective
worth pursuing.
If, instead of accepting the objective of "making the product
line pay its way," one accepts the Restatement (Third) theme
of a lesser scope of liability than that required to "make the
product pay its way," then, looking at the matter from the
COST-BENEFIT perspective suggested above might lead one
to the following formulation:
A product line is "defective in design" if (a) is greater than
(b), when:
(a) is the sum of
(1) zero (because no added manufacturing cost is
incurred), and
(2) RISK when the safety feature is not added (that
is, the reasonably predictable cost of compensating
for the injuries forseeably resulting from the prod-
uct line without the safety feature); and
(b) is the sum of
(1) the added cost of manufacturing and marketing
that product line with the safety feature identified
in a feasible alternative design, and
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(2) RISK when the safety feature is added (that is, the
reasonably predictable cost of compensating for the
injuries foreseeably resulting from the product line
of the alternative design that has the safety fea-
ture).
The definition of defect presented above is very close in
substance to that Professor Owen has recommended. 2' His
proposal, as I understand it, is that instead of asking jurors to
think about the total cost-benefit (or the total PL or total
RISK) of the original product line and the total cost-benefit (or
the total PL or total RISK) for the altered product line, we ask
the jurors to focus only on the additions or reductions of cost
and the additions or reductions of usefulness resulting from the
alteration. Neither evidence nor argument about the overall
cost-benefit (or overall PL or overall RISK) would be needed
at trial.22 This excellent proposal led me to devise the formula-
tion presented immediately below. This revised formulation
includes two alternative forms of introduction, the second of
which also assigns the burden of proof. Both formulations
consider that the private decisionmaker is not to be faulted for
a decision not to add the proposed safety feature if that deci-
sion would have been reasonable when made, even if in hind-
sight the judge and jury think the better decision would have
been to add the safety feature. The first formulation instructs
the jury as follows:
A product is defective in design if no reasonable person
would have believed, after reasonable investigation, that:
the sum of the added cost (in dollars) of making the product
with the proposed alteration and the reduction in useful-
ness of the product resulting from the alteration (in dollars)
would be as much as or greater than the reduction of
harms and losses (in dollars) resulting from the alteration.
With alternative introductory phrasing, placing the burden
of proof, an instruction might say:
You will find that a product is defective in design if, but
only if, you find by a preponderance of the evidence that no
21. See Owen, supra note 14, at 200-01.
22. See id. at 205.
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reasonable person would have believed, after reasonable
investigation, that: the sum of the added cost (in dollars)
of making the product with the proposed alteration and the
reduction in usefulness of the product resulting from the
alteration (in dollars) would be as much as or greater than
the reduction of harms and losses (in dollars) resulting
from the alteration.
Any calculus of the two separate sets of figures for this
comparison depends on whether we assume the full tort
measure of damages for each victim in quantifying RISK (or
LOSS as part of PL) in dollars or instead use some other
measure (for example, that fashioned by Congress for DPT
vaccine cases).23 As a policy matter, although I have a strong
preference for making a product "pay its way," I would also
propose that serious consideration be given to defining "pay its
way" as providing payment to victims under a refashioned
measure of damages. This refashioned damages approach
would compensate for all economic losses at the full rate of the
tort measure but not for all noneconomic harms.24
In any event, the point I am suggesting is that as long as one
treats RISK consistently, RISK can be calculated for use on the
COST side of the COST-BENEFIT comparison while assuming
that either the tort measure of damages or some other measure
of compensation will apply to victims' claims that are deter-
mined to be legally meritorious.
According to my reading of the great majority of judicial
decisions in jurisdictions where no "law reform" statute has
spoken to these comparisons, those decisions support continu-
ing the goal of products "paying their own way" in products
liability law,25 in the same sense as I believe section 402A and
its comments support that goal.26 Determining what constitutes
"paying their own way" will not result in treating the entire
RISK (or PL) as a part of the product's COST. Although other
contributing causes, including the victims' own causal conduct,
may share the burden of that COST, I do not find any cases
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22 (1991).
24. This is not to suggest that I favor caps, however. That is the most unfair way
to fashion limitations on the measure of recovery, because it is harshest to the very
victims who are most seriously injured and, for that reason, most in need of reason-
able compensation.
25. See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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that justify treating none of the RISK (or PL) as part of the
product's COST. This is the case even when the product is one
whose true COST (including the cost of paying for an appropri-
ate share of RISK or PL) is less than its BENEFIT (as mea-
sured by what buyers as a group are willing to pay).
Any COST-BENEFIT analysis will expose fundamental policy
issues about the scope of products liability in design and
warning cases. The Restatement (Third), however, gives trial
judges and trial lawyers very little, if any, guidance about how
verdict forms and jury instructions should define such key
concepts and terms as "defect," "unreasonably dangerous," and
"reasonably adequate warning." Existing statutes and prece-
dents to which a trial judge and trial lawyers might turn also
disappoint the judges and lawyers who search them for guid-
ance in drafting clear and understandable jury instructions. In
one significant respect, however, they can be helpful.
Precedents frequently cite section 402A with approval,27 and
in explaining their approval frequently recite comments to
section 402A regarding the history of development of strict
liability, first in products for human consumption, next in
products for intimate bodily use, and later more generally.28
Included in these comments are allusions to the policy grounds
that cut across the evolving legal theories. For example, the
idea that public policy dictates placing the burden of compen-
sating victims on the COST side of the COST-BENEFIT
comparison is first found in comment c: "public policy demands
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who market
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained ....
This excerpt from comment c speaks of "products intended
for consumption."30 As explained in comment b, products
designed for human consumption first gave rise to a form of
27. See, e.g., Brokenshire v. Rivas & Rivas, Ltd., 922 P.2d 696, 698 n.2 (Or. 1996)
(stating that Oregon adopted section 402A with only minor changes); Ulmer v. Ford
Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729, 734-35 (Wash. 1969) (adopting language of section 402A for
strict liability of manufacturers).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. a-g (1965); see also
Brokenshire, 922 P.2d at 698 n.2 (noting the legislature's express intent that its
statute enacting section 402A be construed in accordance with comments a-m); Young
v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 62-63 (Wash. 1996) (noting that comment k has
been adopted into Washington law).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965) (emphasis added).
30. Id. cmt. c.
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strict liability. Any notion, however, that the above public
policy rationale applies only to products for human consump-
tion is quickly dispelled as one proceeds to comment d, which
observes that the evolving law of the twentieth century had
extended the rule of strict liability to other products, before the
ALI adopted section 402A:
The rule stated in this Section is not limited to the sale of
food for human consumption, or other products for intimate
bodily use, although it will obviously include them. It
extends to any product sold in the condition, or substantial-
ly the same condition, in which it is expected to reach the
ultimate user or consumer.3'
It bears emphasis that the "expectation" test stated in com-
ment d is not a "consumer expectation" test, about which
controversy currently rages.32 Rather, the phrase in comment
d, "it is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer,
33
could be reasonably interpreted to mean that it is expected,
from the point of view of a reasonable person in the position of
the seller, to reach the ultimate user or consumer.
The comments to section 402A, like the section itself, reflect
public policy reasoning from the contemporaneous discourse of
the late 1950s and early 1960s. The current edition of Prosser
and Keeton on Torts makes this point in the following state-
ment:
The policy reasons that courts and writers were giving
around 1960 to justify the imposition of strict liability on
manufacturers and other merchant sellers for physical
harm to persons and tangible things went far beyond any
liability based on conventional contractual notions....
... The costs of damaging events due to defectively
dangerous products can best be borne by the enterprisers
who make and sell these products. Those who are mer-
chants and especially those engaged in the manufacturing
31. Id. cmt. d.
32. See, e.g., Angela C. Rushton, Comment, Design Defects Under the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and the Goals of a Functional
Approach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389, 397-98 (1996) (discussing the controversy surrounding
the consumer expectations test).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (1965).
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enterprise have the capacity to distribute the losses of the
few among the many who purchase the products. It is not
a "deep pocket" theory but rather a "risk-bearing economic"
theory. The assumption is that the manufacturer can shift
the costs of accidents to purchasers for use by charging
higher prices for the costs of products. This can be regarded
as a fairness and justice reason of policy. The costs of
accidents attributable to defective products are internalized
and passed on in a rough sort of way, although some may
be unable to survive a disastrous experience with a particu-
lar product.34
Forcing products to pay their way to benefit the public
interest was a widely held point of view in the 1960s. This view
is explained more fully in Venturing to Do Justice: Reforming
Private Law,35 published in 1969. Among the book's key points
are the following:
(1) The arrival of a new era of strict products liability was
no longer in doubt after 1963.36 In a deeper sense, however, it
is more accurate to call this period an era of "products liabili-
ties, in the plural, for the new cases disclose[d] not one but an
array of somewhat inconsistent theories, with no dominant
choice yet clear."37
(2) The California and New York courts of last resort
framed the key issue somewhat differently. These courts even
used different means to express the same facts. A New York
judge, describing a California case, personified a defective
machine by declaring the question to be whether the
"Shopsmith" (the power tool in question) "threw a piece of wood
at a user."38
If that suggests machines revolting against their masters,
perhaps less disturbing is the description by the California
court, deciding the case. As they put it, personifying the
wood rather than the machine, a piece of wood the user
34. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 98, at 692-93 (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted).
35. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMNG PRIVATE LAw (1969).
36. See id. at 101.
37. Id. at 101-02. For a discussion of the "new cases," see supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text.
38. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 1963).
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wished to make into a chalice "suddenly flew out of the
machine and struck him on the forehead, inflicting serious
injuries."39
The two courts' approaches to the relevant legal issue differed
as well. The California court stated:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient
that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the
Shopsmith in a way it was intended to be used as a result
of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was
not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended
use.
40
Chief Judge Desmond, writing for the majority of the New
York Court of Appeals, applied a different formulation: "The
question now to be answered is: does a manufacturer's implied
warranty of fitness of his product for its contemplated use run
in favor of all its intended users, despite lack of privity of
contract?"
41
(3) Precedents of the 1960s were curiously disparate with
respect to who would be strictly liable to an injured person.
As to choosing which among the various persons in the
chain of manufacture and marketing shall be subject to
strict liability for injury a product causes, there is a curious
and interesting comparison between the views of the New
York court in Goldberg and the views developed in a se-
quence of Texas cases involving impure foods. One Texas
case held the manufacturer of the impure food subject to
strict liability. Another case held the retailer liable. And in
a third case, [Bowman Biscuit Co. v. Hines, 251 S.W.2d 153
(Tex. 1952),] a closely divided court held a wholesaler not
subject to strict liability.
Does this mean that in Texas the man in the middle is
safe and those on each flank are exposed, but in New York
the man in the middle is liable and those on each flank are
safe? Perhaps the precedents in these two states can be
39. KEETON, supra note 35, at 102 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377
P.2d 897, 898 (Cal. 1962) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
40. Id. (quoting Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901).
41. Id. at 102-03 (quoting Goldberg, 191 N.E.2d at 81).
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reconciled on the ground that when the middleman is the
assembler, as in Goldberg, he has potential control over the
defect, whereas if he is merely a merchandising channel,
as in Bowman, others in the chain of marketing may be
better targets for responsibility. But should we distinguish
the New York and Texas cases and attempt to sustain both
rules, or should one or both rules be changed?
4 2
(4) The eventual impact of strict liability depends only in
part on whom courts hold to be subject to liability to an injured
person.
Who eventually bears the cost of payment made to
victims under strict products liability? This question may
be answered temporarily by contracts among the various
entities involved in bringing the product to the consumer.
Claims for indemnity or contribution are subject to con-
tractual modification, and such contracts are likely to be
made in a high percentage of cases, at least after the
doctrine of strict products liability becomes well known.
Indeed, such contracts will be likely to determine the
secondary impact regardless of the victim's or the court's
choice of one or another entity as an immediate target of
strict liability, unless there is a supplemental rule declar-
ing it against public policy to modify by contract the inci-
dence of this liability.
Whichever entity pays the victim will ordinarily wish to
pass the cost forward toward the consumer or backward
toward some supplier. The first supplier against whom any
effort is plausible will resist with greater vigor since the
only direction in which [the first supplier] can pass the cost
is forward. Thus, the pressure is stronger in general for
passing costs forward. If the economic market is fully
responsive to this pressure, the full burden eventually rests
on the consumers of the product, because it is reflected in
the price they must pay.43
(5) The policy argument that products should pay their
way was a theme discussed in many tort classrooms of the
42. Id. at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
43. Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added).
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1950s and 1960s.41 It was also a powerful influence in the
courtrooms of the 1950s and 1960s, where the law of strict
products liability was developing. Of course, this was not the
only policy argument brought to bear, and it alone could not
explain the lawmaking decisions of legislatures and courts,
without taking into account other policy arguments that were
used at that time.
(6) Another policy argument prevalent in the classrooms
and courtrooms of the 1950s and 1960s is that the choice
regarding who initially pays for victims' losses may have
practical significance due to the risk of financial irresponsi-
bility.45 It is no comfort to a victim to have a theoretically valid
claim against a financially irresponsible defendant. "Nor is this
comfort for the economic planner who intends the eventual
impact of strict products liability to be reflected in the price of
the product."46
(7) Policy arguments of the 1950s and 1960s also account-
ed for a variety of unjust enrichment theories, one conceived
of more broadly than in the sense defined by the established
precedents that allowed legal or equitable remedies.47 The
policy argument on this subject extended to "activities" or
"enterprises," as well as "products." The key element of this
argument is that an outcome analogous to "unjust enrichment"
would occur unless the costs of products and activities, "includ-
ing the costs of paying for accidental losses [they] causef], [are]
borne by those who benefit from the [products and activities]
and, insofar as practicable, in proportion to the benefits they
realize."4"
Of course, no single policy argument is ever sufficient to
explain a body of legal rules. Even where a single policy is
advanced there may be other considerations lurking behind the
rule. For example, appellate opinions citing section 402A with
approval, and trial court charges that cite and quote from
44. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
45. See KEETON, supra note 35, at 107.
46. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 110-11 (discussing cases involving
impurities in foods).
47. See id. at 159-61.
48. Id. at 159 (emphasis added); see also id. at 161 (making products and
activities pay their way provides "an economic incentive and a selector separating
socially useful activities [or products], which can pay their way in society even with
this added cost, from the socially undesirable activities [or products] that cause more
harm than they are worth").
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section 402A's comments, have in many instances identified the
idea of causing products to pay their way,49 as a public policy
reason for strict liability, though these opinions seldom added,
as did section 402A, comment c, that the marketer could buy
liability insurance to cover the cost of compensating victims.5 °
In conclusion, trial courts often borrow language from
appellate opinions and from Restatements,51 even though appel-
late opinions and Restatements have rarely been drafted with
an explicit purpose of expressing ideas in a form suitable for
use in instructing a jury.5 2 The modification of section 402A,
proposed by the Restatement (Third), if used by trial judges in
instructions that juries understand and apply, will tend to cut
back on the scope of products liability. This reality increases
the significance of developing verdict forms and jury instruc-
tions that adequately address the factual and legal issues in
particular cases, and do so in a form that the juries can apply.
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE CHARGE TO THE JURY
From time to time the illustrative charge presented below
presents alternative drafts of a particular segment of the
charge. The greater percentage of the illustrative charge is,
however, appropriate regardless of how the unanswered
questions of law discussed earlier in this Article are answered.
The text of an entire charge is presented to illustrate the
context into which the alternative formulations are set.
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
You have heard the evidence and the arguments in this case.
It is now my duty to instruct you on the law that you must
49. See, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 867 F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir.
1989) (discussing and supporting adoption of section 402A to shift the financial burden
of defective products to manufacturers); Symons v. Mueller Co., 493 F.2d 972, 974
(10th Cir. 1974) (discussing the trial court's jury instruction detailing the public policy
rationales for strict products liability).
50. See supra text accompanying note 29.
51. See, e.g., Witt v. Norfe, Inc., 725 F.2d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 1984) (discussing
the trial court's misuse of an appellate court's definition of"defect" in a jury instruc-
tion); Harber v. Altec Indus., 812 F. Supp. 954, 957 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965)).
52. Cf Witt, 725 F.2d at 1279 (noting that the trial court's incorrect use of the
term "defect" misled the jury).
WINTER AND SPRING 19971 Origins, Policies, and Directions 399
follow and apply. When I have finished, you will begin your
discussion with each other-what we call your deliberations.
To help you understand and remember these instructions on
the law, I will divide them into three main parts: First, open-
ing general instructions intended to guide you throughout your
deliberations; second, more -specific instructions about the
claims and defenses, about questions you will be asked to
answer (as stated in the verdict form), and about the law you
must apply in considering these questions; and, third, some




All of my instructions are about the law you must apply. I
do not intend for you to understand these instructions as my
comment on the facts or on the evidence in this case. It is your
function to determine the facts. Although the law allows a trial
judge in this court to comment on evidence, I deliberately do
not do so and instead leave the factfinding entirely in your
hands.
Fortunately, you do not need to resolve every factual dispute
raised by the evidence. In order to know which factual disputes
are important, you need to know what rules of law to apply. I
have explained some of these rules to you in the course of the
trial, and I will explain others to you now.
You must follow all of the rules as I explain them to you. Do
not follow any single sentence or statement by itself, because
it might have an exception or qualification that I have stated
elsewhere in these instructions. Therefore, you must consider
all these instructions together, as a unit.
The lawyers were allowed to comment during the trial both
on the evidence and on the rules of law. But if what they have
said about the evidence differs from your memory, let your
collective memory control. And if what they have said about
the law seems to you to have a different meaning in any way
from my instructions on the law, you must be guided only by
my instructions.
Even if you disagree with one or more of the rules of law I
tell you about, or don't understand the reason for some of the
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rules, you are bound to follow them. This rule-that you must
follow the law as stated to you by the trial judge-is a funda-
mental part of our system of government. Our system is
governed by the law rather than by the individual views of the
judge and jury who have the responsibility for deciding this
case. If I make any mistake in instructing you about the law,
fair and evenhanded application of the law to this and other
cases is nevertheless assured because any mistake I make on
the law can be corrected on appeal.
In contrast, your decision on disputed facts is final. That is,
your findings on material disputed facts are not subject to
appeal. You are the final judges of the facts.
In your factfinding, of course, you are not to be swayed by
bias, prejudice, sympathy, or antagonism. It is your function
to find the facts fairly and impartially, on the basis of the
evidence.
The evidence in the case consists of the sworn testimony of
the witnesses (including testimony by deposition), all exhibits
received in evidence, and all facts that may have been admitted
or stipulated.
Statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence in the
case, unless made as an admission or stipulation of fact. When
the attorneys for opposing parties stipulate or agree as to the
existence of a fact, however, there is no need for evidence for
any party on that point. You must accept the stipulation as
evidence, and take that fact as proved.
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom
is not evidence, and you must disregard it entirely.
You must consider the evidence and find the facts as you
decide the evidence has proved them.
Also, from the facts proved, you may draw reasonable infer-
ences about additional facts. An inference is a deduction or
conclusion. An inference is an additional finding that your
experience, reason, and common sense lead you to draw from
facts that you find are proved by evidence.
I will give you just two illustrations, unrelated to any of the
evidence in this case, to make the meaning of inference clear.
When you hear a knock on your door, you may draw an
inference that some person is there, knocking. If you also
know, however, that a stormy wind is blowing and you have
trees close to your house, then, based on your experience and
common sense, you may have trouble deciding whether to infer
that someone is at the door, or to infer that the wind has blown
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a tree limb against the house, or just deciding that you do not
have a sufficient basis to decide what inference to draw. It is
for you, as judges of the facts, to decide whether the evidence
before you is or is not sufficient for you to draw an inference.
Before I give you the second illustration of what we mean by
the term "inference," I will explain two more phrases often
used in discussions about evidence received in a trial. The two
phrases are "direct evidence" and "circumstantial evidence."
Testimony of a witness showing firsthand observation of a
fact by that witness is direct evidence. For example, the
testimony of an eyewitness describing what he or she saw is
direct evidence. If the witness is permitted to go beyond stating
what he or she saw and is permitted to state a conclusion, or
inference, or opinion, that part of the answer is not direct
evidence. Instead, it is one kind of circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is proof of some facts-including
events and circumstances-on the basis of which the jury may
infer the existence or nonexistence of an additional fact or
facts. As I told you a few moments ago, in explaining the
meaning of "inference," you may use your common sense and
common experience in deciding whether proof of one set of facts
is sufficient, as circumstantial evidence, to prove another fact
in dispute.
I gave you one illustration of circumstantial evidence a few
minutes ago, as I was explaining the meaning of "inference."
Now I will give you a second illustration of what we mean by
inference, what we mean by circumstantial evidence, and what
is the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.
At a given time, one person was standing on a sidewalk observ-
ing rain falling. That person's later testimony, "I saw it rain-
ing," is direct evidence that it was raining at that given time.
In contrast, a second person was inside a building at that given
time. This second person later gives testimony, "I was in the
lobby of a building, and I saw people coming in with wet coats
and umbrellas." This testimony is circumstantial evidence that
it was raining outside at that time; it supports an inference
that it was raining outside.
Direct and circumstantial evidence have equal standing in
law. That is, with respect to what weight shall be given to
evidence before you, the law makes no distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence. Also, no greater degree of
certainty is required of circumstantial evidence than of direct
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evidence. You are to consider all the evidence in the case and
give each item of evidence the weight you believe it deserves.
At times during the trial you heard lawyers object to ques-
tions asked by another lawyer and to answers by witnesses. It
is a proper function of lawyers to object. In objecting, a lawyer
is requesting that a trial judge make a decision on a question
of law. Do not draw from such objections, or from my rulings
on the objections, any inferences about facts. The objections
and my rulings related only to legal questions that I had to
determine. They should not influence your thinking about the
facts.
When I sustained an objection to a question, the witness was
not allowed to answer it after my ruling. Do not attempt to
guess what answer might have been given had I allowed the
question to be answered. And if you heard an answer to the
question before my ruling, you are to disregard it.
I will state the same point now more broadly. In your delib-
erations, do not consider or talk about any question to which
I sustained an objection or any answer or other statement that
I excluded, or struck, or in some other way told you not to
consider.
Also, if I received evidence but told you it was received for
a limited purpose, or if in the present instructions I tell you
that some of the evidence is to be considered only for a limited
purpose, you are bound by that limitation.
An important part of your job as jurors will be deciding
whether you believe what each person had to say, and how
important that testimony was. In making that decision I
suggest that you ask yourself a few questions: Did the person
seem honest? Did he or she have some reason not to tell the
truth? Did he or she have something to gain or lose in the
outcome of this case? Did the witness seem to have a good
memory? Did the witness have the opportunity, and was the
witness able to observe accurately the things he or she testified
about? Did he or she understand the questions and answer
them directly? Did the witness's testimony differ from the
testimony of other witnesses or from testimony that the same
witness gave earlier? Was the witness's testimony on
cross-examination different from the testimony given on direct
examination? These are some, but of course not all, of the
kinds of things that will help you decide how much weight to
give to what each witness said.
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You may also consider any demonstrated bias, prejudice or
hostility of a witness in deciding what weight to give to the
testimony of the witness.
The mere number of witnesses or length of the testimony or
number of exhibits has no bearing on what weight you give to
evidence, or on whether you find that the burden of proof has
been met. Weight does not mean the amount of the evidence.
Weight means your judgment about the credibility and impor-
tance of the evidence.
You may consider inconsistencies or differences as you weigh
evidence, but you do not have to discredit testimony merely
because there are inconsistencies or differences in the testimo-
ny of a witness, or between the testimony of different witness-
es. Two or more persons witnessing an incident or a transac-
tion may see or hear it differently. Innocent misrecollection,
like failure of recollection, is a common experience. In weighing
the effect of any inconsistency or difference, consider whether
it concerns a matter of importance or an unimportant detail,
and whether it results from innocent error or intentional false-
hood.
You are not required to accept testimony, even if it is un-
contradicted. You may decide, because of the witness's bearing
and demeanor, or because of inherent improbability, or for
other reasons sufficient to you, that testimony is not worthy
of belief.
You may accept all of a witness's testimony or you may reject
all of it, or you may accept parts and reject other parts.
You will recall that during the trial, a witness was some-
times asked to give testimony about whether that witness or
some other witness, before trial, made a statement about some
fact. By a statement about some fact I mean a statement that
expressly or impliedly asserts that some event occurred or
some fact existed. The before-trial statements to which I refer
include statements made in documents.
A before-trial statement about a fact may be brought to your
attention to help you decide whether you believe and credit the
testimony at trial of the witness who made the statement
before trial. If you find that a witness, before trial, knowingly
gave a false statement concerning any material matter, you
may take that into account in deciding whether to distrust the
testimony at trial. You may credit the testimony of that wit-
ness at trial, or give it no credit, or only such credit as you
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think it deserves. Also, if a witness said something different
about any material matter earlier, even though truthfully, and
you decide that the two statements are in conflict, then you
may consider whether there is reason for you to doubt or
discredit the testimony given.
With respect to a statement made before trial about a
matter, except as I tell you otherwise in these instructions or
have told you in instructions during trial, you cannot treat that
statement as evidence in this case for any other purpose than
to determine how it bears, if at all, on the credibility of the
witness.
Now I will explain an exception to this rule that applies in
this case.
If a party (that is, a plaintiff or a defendant), or a represen-
tative authorized to speak for a party, admitted some fact
through an earlier statement, act or omission, then you may
consider the earlier statement, act or omission both for the
purpose of judging the credibility of that person as a witness
and as evidence of the truth of the fact so admitted.
Here is another exception: Regardless of whether the witness
is a party, if the earlier statement was given under oath in a
deposition, you may consider the earlier statement both for the
purpose of judging the credibility of the person as a witness
and as evidence of the truth of the facts it asserts.
During the trial of this case, certain testimony has been read
to you from depositions or presented to you audiovisually. A
deposition contains sworn, recorded answers to questions asked
of the witness before trial by one or more of the attorneys for
the parties. Deposition testimony is entitled to the same
consideration, and is to be judged as to credibility and weighed
in the same way as testimony from the witness stand.
During the trial you heard the testimony of witnesses who
answered some questions put to them as persons having
specialized skill or knowledge. Such a witness is often referred
to as an "expert witness." The mere fact that a witness is
allowed to testify as an "expert" (or, more precisely speaking,
as one having specialized knowledge or experience) does not
indicate that you must believe that testimony. The credibility
of each witness is for you to determine.
The law allows a person having specialized knowledge or
experience to state an opinion in court about matters in that
person's particular field. The fact that such a witness has
expressed an opinion does not mean, however, that you must
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accept that opinion. It is for you to decide whether the opinions
expressed were mere speculations or guesses, which you should
disregard, or were based on sound reasons, judgment, and
facts.
If you find that part or all of the opinion testimony was
based on stated or unstated assumptions, and you further find
that those assumptions are contrary to what you find from the
evidence before you, then you will disregard any part of the
opinion testimony that was based on assumptions contrary to
your fact findings.
Also, your decision whether to rely upon opinion testimony
will depend on your judgment about whether the witness's
training and experience is sufficient for him or her to give the
opinion that you heard.
It is up to you, bearing all these considerations in mind, to
decide whether you believe and choose to rely on the testimony
of a witness having specialized knowledge or experience. You
may accept all of it, part of it, or none of it, as you find appro-
priate.
On each issue submitted to you in this case, one party or the
other has the burden of proof to establish that party's claim or
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
To establish by a preponderance of the evidence means to
prove that something is more likely than not. In other words,
a preponderance of the evidence in the case means such evi-
dence that, when considered and compared with that opposed
to it, has more convincing force, and produces in your minds
the belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true
than not true.
In determining whether any fact in issue has been proved by
a preponderance of the evidence in the case, the jury may,
unless otherwise instructed, consider the testimony of all
witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all
exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have
produced them. The burden of proof has not been carried if,
after you have considered all the evidence, you find that you
must speculate, guess, or imagine that one or more of the
necessary facts is true.
Although, on each issue, the burden is on one party to prove
that party's contention on that issue by a preponderance of the
evidence in the case, this rule does not, of course, require proof
to an absolute certainty. Proof to an absolute certainty is
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seldom possible in any case. Nor is proof beyond reasonable
doubt or by clear and convincing evidence required; a burden
of proof by these more stringent standards applies in criminal
cases and in other special circumstances. In civil cases general-
ly, and in particular as to all the issues in this case, the
standard for defining the burden of proof is the preponderance
of the evidence standard.
In applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, you
will find that a party has succeeded in meeting the burden of
proof on an issue of fact if, after considering of all the evidence
in the case, and on the basis of evidence, you find that what
is sought to be proved on that issue is more likely true than
not true.
PART II
Comment: The next segment of the Charge, immediately below,
is presented in alternatives. The first alternative concerns two
theories-negligence and breach of warranty. It fits with Verdict
Form One.
[This is an action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover on
two theories, negligence and breach of warranty. As to the
negligence theory, you will be required to consider the conduct
of the defendant and also the conduct of the plaintiff. As to the
breach of warranty theory you will be required to consider the
characteristics of the defendant's product, a question about
plaintiffs conduct, and questions about causation.]
Comment: The second alternative, immediately below, fits
with Verdict Form Two.
[This is an action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover on
two theories, negligence and strict liability. As to the negli-
gence theory, you will be required to consider the conduct of
the defendant and also the conduct of the plaintiff. As to the
strict liability theory you will need to consider the character-
istics of the defendant's product and questions about causa-
tion.]
Comment: The third alternative, immediately below, fits with
Verdict Form Three.
[This is an action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover on
the theory of products liability.]
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In the remainder of these instructions, I will define more
precisely the nature of the questions you must consider.
Comment: Two alternatives are presented for the next
segment of the charge. The first alternative is for use with
Verdict Form One; the second, with Verdict Form Two. No
segment of this kind is needed with Verdict Form Three.
First Alternative (Use With Verdict Form One)
[Under [Massachusetts] law, the plaintiff can recover by
proving the elements of either one of the two alternative
theories he advances. In other words, plaintiff has alleged that
the defendant was negligent, and plaintiff has alleged a breach
of warranty by the defendant. If the plaintiff proves the ele-
ments of either of these two theories, he is entitled to recover.]
Second Alternative (Use with Verdict Form Two)
[Under [named State] law, the plaintiff can recover by
proving the elements of either one of the two alternative
theories he advances. In other words, plaintiff has alleged that
the defendant was negligent, and plaintiff has alleged [that
there were defects in defendant's product]. If the plaintiff
proves the elements of either of these two theories, he is
entitled to recover.]
In this case, I am submitting [five] [four] questions to you
(with some subparts). You have copies of these questions in
your hands so you may follow your copy as I read a particular
question and explain it.
[READ QUESTION 1.]
Verdict Form One:
1(a). Was Power Engineering Co. negligent in relation to the
design of the motor generator unit that the plaintiff was
testing when he was injured?
YES NO
1(b). If YES, was Power Engineering Co.'s negligence in
this respect a proximate cause of the injury?
YES -NO
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Verdict Form Two
1(a). Was Power Engineering Co. negligent in relation to
the design of the motor generator unit that the plaintiff was
testing when he was injured?
-YES -NO
1(b). If YES, was Power Engineering Co.'s negligence in
this respect a proximate cause of the injury?
-YES -NO
Comment: Use the next segment in Verdict Forms One and
Two but not Three.
[In order to find for the plaintiff against the defendant on a
negligence claim, you must find both (1) that the defendant was
negligent and (2) that the defendant's negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident.]
[In order to find negligence, you must find facts indicating
a duty on the part of the defendant to exercise reasonable care
for the plaintiff and a failure to fulfill that duty to exercise
reasonable care.]
[In explaining the law about the defendant's duties, I will be
referring to the rules of law that apply to all of those who
design a product, manufacture the product, assemble the
product, distribute the product, or sell the product. Persons or
entities such as corporations who are designers, manufacturers,
assemblers, or sellers are all treated in law as part of a "mar-
keting chain."]
[In some circumstances and subject to rules that I will
explain to you later, insofar as they bear on this case, each
person or entity in the marketing chain may be held legally
responsible for reasonably foreseeable injuries to others. For
example, in some circumstances, an entity that manufactured
a product but did not design it can still be liable for a design
defect in the product. Similarly, in some circumstances, an
entity that sold a product that it neither designed nor manu-
factured can be liable for a design defect in the product. As I
will explain more fully later in these instructions, reasonable
foreseeability of the circumstances of marketing and use of the
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product is one of the factors you may consider in deciding
whether there was breach of a duty of reasonable care.]
[Under [name of State] law, contracts among the different
entities in the marketing chain may control the legal responsi-
bilities between those entities. Their contracts among them-
selves, however, do not determine the legal responsibility of any
of them to other persons who are not among the contracting
parties. I will give you more explanation of this point later in
these instructions.]
[For convenience throughout the remainder of this charge I
will use the one word "marketer" to refer to any entity in the
marketing chain whether that entity is the designer, the
manufacturer, the assembler, or the seller of the product.]
[Now I will explain what we mean by "negligence." Negli-
gence is a breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care. A
claim of negligence is based on a defendant's duty of reasonable
care. In general, a defendant has a duty, both when doing a
particular thing and when engaging in a course of conduct, to
use reasonable care to protect against reasonably foreseeable
injuries to other persons and their property.]
[It is a breach of the duty of reasonable care to fail to exer-
cise that degree of care, vigilance, and forethought that an
ordinarily prudent person would have exercised in the same or
similar circumstances.]
[Question 1 concerns plaintiffs claim of negligent design of
the motor generator unit at issue in this case. The focus in a
claim of design negligence is on whether the product is de-
signed with reasonable care to eliminate reasonably avoidable
dangers.]
[A marketer (including each participant in the marketing
chain) must exercise reasonable care to anticipate the environ-
ment in which its product will be used, and it must design
against the reasonably foreseeable risks attending the prod-
uct's use in that setting. This foreseeable environment includes
such things as misuse of a product, instinctual reaction,
momentary inadvertence, and forgetfulness, if you find that an
ordinarily prudent person in the position of the marketer would
foresee such things and protect against them.]
[It is not necessary that any precise accident be foreseen. It
is necessary, however, that the risk of harm by an accident of
the general nature of the one that occurred be reasonably
foreseeable.]
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[You will consider the defendant's conduct from the point of
view of a reasonable person-that is, an ordinarily prudent
person-in the position of the defendant as one of the mar-
keters of the motor generator unit at the time of the act or
omission of the defendant alleged to be negligent. You will take
account of what a reasonable marketer in the position of the
defendant would have known at the time of each alleged act
or omission, about the foreseeable hazards of a machine it
designs, produces, or markets. In judging the defendant's
conduct at any particular time that the defendant acted or,
having a duty to act, failed to act, you will consider what a
reasonable marketer would have known at that time, taking
account of the difference, if any, in the state of development of
knowledge of hazards at different times, and taking into
account the actual knowledge of potential hazards that the
defendant had at different times. You will also take account of
the defendant's experience and expert knowledge in the field.]
[A corporation can act only through its officers and employ-
ees. In a case such as this one, the law holds a corporation
responsible for the acts of its officers and employees in the
scope of their employment. Thus, for example, in considering
whether the defendant knew or should have known of a risk,
you will find that the defendant knew or should have known
if you find that any of its officers or employees, acting in the
scope of employment, knew or should have known.]
[A marketer of a product is allowed some range for the
exercise of judgment regarding the design of its product. The
mere fact that an alternate design is available does not require
its adoption. As long as the product is designed with reasonable
safety, and the judgment regarding design is in accordance
with the reasonable care that would have been exercised by a
reasonably prudent designer under similar circumstances, the
marketer's judgment about design is permissible.]
[A marketer is not an insurer against injury that results
from the use of its products.]
[The duty that the law of negligence imposes on a marketer
is not that of perfection; rather it is that of reasonable care.
The failure of a marketer to adopt a better safeguard does not
make the marketer legally liable unless in not adopting a
better safeguard the marketer has failed to exercise reasonable
care.]
[A marketer of a product is not obliged to make the product
absolutely injury-proof. The duty, as I have said, is one of
reasonable care to protect against foreseeable harm.]
[In evaluating the adequacy of a product's design, you should
consider the gravity of any danger you find to be posed by the
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design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the
feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an
improved design, and the adverse consequences, if any, that
such a changed design might pose to the product and to its
reasonably foreseeable users.]
[Comment: The next instructive paragraph is a commonly
used instruction identifying "factors" to be considered. It does
not state or define precisely what it is that the jury must con-
clude in order to find "negligence" with respect to design. Absent
objection on this precise ground, or a precisely framed request,
the earlier instructions defining "negligence" are commonly
treated as sufficient explanation of what it is the jury must find,
after considering "factors," to make the ultimate finding of
"negligence."]
Comment: The next segment fits with Verdict Forms One and
Two, but not Three.
[Evidence of compliance or noncompliance with industry or
government practices and standards may be considered by you
as evidence bearing on negligence. Neither compliance nor
noncompliance with industry or government practices and
standards is alone decisive of the claim of negligence, because
independently of industry or government standards and
practices, a marketer has a duty of reasonable care.]
[Thus, if the evidence supports a finding that reasonable care
requires something more than was required by industry or
government standards and practice, you may find negligence
even in the face of evidence of compliance with those industry
or government standards and practices.]
[On the other hand and in addition, noncompliance with
industry or government standards and practices is not alone
decisive. It is only some evidence of negligence.]
[Just as evidence of compliance or noncompliance with
industry or government practices or standards is not decisive
but may be considered by you as part of the total circumstances
bearing on negligence, so, too, you may consider as evidence
that is not decisive but is among all the circumstances you take
into account, evidence of contractual arrangements among
entities in the marketing chain about which entity among them
will be contractually responsible to the others to take actions
to protect against one or more foreseeable risks of injuries to
others. In the present case you are not asked to determine the
obligations of the contracting parties among themselves. The
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evidence that you have heard about those contractual arrange-
ments, however, is evidence that you may consider, along with
other evidence before you, in deciding the questions submitted
to you.]
[In closing these instructions on negligence, I emphasize that
you must bear in mind that in answering questions about
negligence you are to apply the standard of reasonable care as
I have defined it for you. You are to reach your finding in light
of all the facts and circumstances in evidence before you. If you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was
negligent as to design, you will answer Question 1(a) YES.
Otherwise, answer it NO. Also, if you find by a preponderance
of the evidence that defendant was negligent as to warnings,
answer Question 2(a) YES. Otherwise, answer it NO.]
[Now I will explain "proximate cause." If you will look at
Question l(b), for example, you will see that if you find the
defendant negligent as to design, then you must consider
whether that negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs
injury. If you find that it was not, you will answer that Ques-
tion NO.
Proximate cause is a technical legal term, the meaning of
which I will now explain. You cannot extract the proper
meaning from the phrase "proximate cause" itself; so you will
need to pay close attention to this explanation.]
[Keep these ideas in mind: First, if the injury would have
happened anyway for other reasons regardless of defendant's
alleged act or omission then that act or omission is not a
proximate cause. This first idea is more often expressed as a
"but-for" rule rather than a "would-have-happened-anyway"
rule. These are two different ways of expressing the same idea.
Lawyers and judges seem to prefer the double negative
form-that is, the way of speaking that says: to find proximate
cause you must find that the injury would not have occurred
but for the alleged act or omission. Another way of expressing
the point is to say, if this injury would have happened any-
way-regardless of defendant's negligence-then defendant's
negligence was not a proximate cause.]
[The second idea you need to keep in mind as you consider
a question about proximate cause is this: the injury must have
been foreseeable in a general sense-not precisely the way it
happened. That is, an injury of that general type or kind must
be reasonably foreseeable. This idea is also expressed by the
phrase "natural and probable consequence."]
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[Now, combining these two ideas together in one definition
of "proximate cause," I instruct you as follows:]
[You will find that an injury or damage was proximately
caused by an act, or a failure to act, if you find, from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in the case, that the injury or
damage would-not have occurred but for the act or omission
and that the injury or damage was a natural and probable
consequence of that act or omission. Note that an accident may
have more than one proximate cause.]
Comment: The next segment fits with Verdict Form One. In
some of the jurisdictions where Verdict Form Two might be
used, precedent does not support this addition.
[Now, I will give you still more explanation of "proximate
cause" as applied to the present case. In order to find that the
defendant's negligence, if you find any, is a proximate cause
of plaintiffs injury for which he can recover damages, you must
find that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor
in bringing about the injury.]
Comment: The next segment fits with Verdict Forms One and
Two, but not Three.
[It is the obligation of the plaintiff to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the causal relationship between any neg-
ligent act or omission of the defendant and plaintiffs injury.
You are not allowed to speculate on the question of causal
relationship.]
[READ QUESTION 2 OF VERDICT FORMS ONE AND TWO.]
Verdict Form One
2(a). Was Power Engineering Co. negligent in relation to
the warnings provided with the motor generator unit the
plaintiff was testing when he was injured?
-YES -NO
2(b). If YES, was Power Engineering Co.'s negligence in
this respect a proximate cause of the injury?
-YES ___NO
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO ONE OR BOTH OF 1(b) AND
2(b), ANSWER QUESTION 3. OTHERWISE, SKIP QUESTION
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Verdict Form Two
2(a). Was Power Engineering Co. negligent in relation to
the warnings provided with the motor generator unit the
plaintiff was testing when he was injured?
-YES NO
2(b). If YES, was Power Engineering Co.'s negligence in
this respect a proximate cause of the injury?
-YES NO
Comment: The next segment fits with Verdict Form One and
Two, but not Three.
[One who markets a product owes a duty of reasonable care
to foreseeable users with respect to providing any instructions
for use of the product and any warnings of hazards that would
be provided by an ordinarily prudent person in the position of
the marketer. In some circumstances, instructions and warn-
ings may be needed to guide users and to alert them to the
severity, gravity, magnitude and extent of any danger involved
in the use of the product. The marketer has a duty of reason-
able care to foresee dangers that will not be apparent to users
and to provide reasonably adequate and effective warnings
about those dangers. If warnings or instructions are needed,
they must be explicit enough to be reasonable for the purpose
of alerting the user to the risks and dangers of the product.]
[A marketer of a product that the marketer knows, or with
reasonable care should know, is unreasonably dangerous in its
nature if not accompanied by instructions and warnings and
who foresees, or with reasonable care should foresee, that it
will be used by some person, known or unknown, who will be
ignorant of the danger, owes a duty to such a person to use
reasonable care to prevent injury to that person.]
[Just as a marketer owes a duty to use due care in making
its products, a marketer also owes the companion duty to warn
of the latent limitations of even a perfectly made article. Even
well made products can be dangerous when the user is ignorant
of their latent limitations and, thus, the marketer has a duty
to warn if he has reason to believe that the user will not
recognize this danger. By "latent limitations" we mean
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limitations that would not be apparent to an ordinarily prudent
person in the position of a foreseeable user.]
[The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the defendant
had reason to foresee that users of the product needed to be
warned of its dangers.]
[In assessing the sufficiency of a warning under the circum-
stances of this case, you may take into account all evidence of
warnings and instructions about use, and all other evidence
bearing on whether it is reasonable to infer that any additional
warning that reasonably could have been provided by the
defendant would have so further alerted the plaintiff as to
avoid the accident.]
[A marketer's duty to warn stems from its opportunity to
have superior knowledge of the characteristics of its product.
Thus, for example, the duty exists when the marketer should
reasonably foresee danger of injury to a less knowledgeable
user unless adequate warning of the danger is given.]
[Also, a marketer must take into account the environment
in which the product may foreseeably be used in determining
its safety and any duty to warn and instruct potential users of
the product. Thus, the duty exists if a reasonably prudent
person in the position of the marketer would foresee inadver-
tence or forgetfulness against which a reasonable warning
would be effective.]
[A particular form of warning is not required unless the
defendant has some reason to suppose that such a form of
warning is needed.]
[In considering whether a particular form of warning is
needed, you may consider whether any danger to which this
warning would call attention was a danger that would be
obvious to a user and, thus, whether such a warning would not
be needed or useful. A marketer does not have a duty to warn
of dangers that would be obvious to a user of the product.]
[If the exercise of reasonable care requires a warning as to
a hazard, the forcefulness of the warning must be reasonably
adapted to the foreseeable danger. In evaluating the adequacy
of a warning, you should consider the gravity of any danger
you find would not be obvious to a user, the likelihood that
such danger would occur, the feasibility of including in a
warning a caution against a particular danger along with
cautions of other particular dangers of equal or greater gravity
and likelihood of occurring, the financial cost, if any, and the
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adverse consequences, if any, to the usefulness of the product
to foreseeable users.]
[You will note that Question 2 uses the terms negligence and
proximate cause. All the instructions I gave you about the
meaning of these terms when I was explaining Question 1
apply to Question 2 also, and I will not repeat them now.]
Comment: The form of Question 3 presented immediately
below appears in Forms One and Two only, not Three, and the
segments of the charge that follow fit with Forms One and Two,
but not Three.
[READ QUESTION 3 OF VERDICT FORMS ONE AND TWO.]
Verdict Form One and Two
3. Do you find that plaintiff Greer was negligent and that
his negligence was a proximate cause contributing to his
injury?
-YES NO
If YES, then taking the negligence of Power Engi-
neering Co. and Greer as 100%, what percentage of
negligence do you attribute to each party? Answer in
percentages that total 100%.
Percentage of negligence of defendant Power
Engineering Co. _ %
Percentage of negligence
of plaintiff Greer %
TOTAL %(100%)
[If you find that the defendant was negligent, and that the
defendant's negligence caused the plaintiffs harm, you must
also consider whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
In this regard, I instruct you that the plaintiff was required by
law to conduct himself in a prudent and careful manner. You
must consider whether he was prudent and careful in using the
product and in the way in which he used it on the day of his
injury. If you find that the plaintiffs conduct did not measure
up to what an ordinarily prudent person would have done, and
that his negligence was a contributing cause of his injury, you
will answer Question 3 YES. If you do not so find, you will
answer Question 3 NO.]
[You may consider evidence of inadvertence or inattentive-
ness to risks as evidence of negligence. If you find that a
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person was inadvertent or inattentive to risks, you may also
find that the inadvertence or inattention to risks was negli-
gence if you find that it occurred when there were no such
circumstances as would have distracted or diverted the atten-
tion of a person who was exercising ordinary care. Thus,
evidence of inadvertence or inattentiveness to risks is relevant
to whether a person was negligent, but such evidence is not
alone decisive. The standard you are to apply in determining
whether plaintiff was negligent is the standard of ordinary
care-the care that would be exercised by an ordinarily pru-
dent person in the same or similar circumstances.]
[You may consider all the evidence you have heard in de-
termining whether you find that plaintiff failed to exercise
reasonable care for his own safety.]
[As to the burden of proof on Question 3, I instruct you that]
Comment: The next segment applies only in a State with
such a statute.
[the plaintiff has the benefit of a statutory presumption that
he was exercising due care and that, as a result of this rebut-
table presumption,]
Comment: The next segment continues an instruction to be
used with Verdict Form One and Two, but not Three.
[the defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff
failed to exercise that degree of care that a reasonably prudent
person ordinarily exercises under like circumstances. Thus, the
defendant has to bear the burden of proof on Question 3. That
is to say, the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the plaintiff was negligent. "Preponderance of
the evidence" has exactly the same meaning here as elsewhere
in these instructions. In Questions 1 and 2, on the other hand,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.]
[If you answer the first part of Question 3 YES, then you
must answer the second part of Question 3.]
Comment: The next segment applies only if the law of the
State so declares.
[If in answering the second part of Question 3 you find that
the negligence of the plaintiff was greater than the negligence
of the defendant (that is, that plaintiffs negligence was more
than 50%), the court will enter judgment on the negligence
claims against the plaintiff and for the defendant. If, on the
other hand, you find plaintiff responsible for 50% or less, then
the percentage that you have found will be applied as a
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percentage of the damages to be deducted in determining the
judgment to be entered. This is a calculation that the clerk will
make at the direction of the court. You are not asked to make
this calculation of reduced damages in answering any of the
questions placed before you.]
Comment: The next question and the instructions that follow
fit with Verdict Form One only. For Verdict Form Two, the
question and the instructions should eliminate the phrase
"implied warranty of fitness" and substitute the phrase "duty
of a marketer to deliver a product that is free of defects of
design or, defects regarding warning." Also, "breach of war-
ranty" should be deleted and "defect" substituted.
[READ QUESTION 4.]
Verdict Form One
4(a). Do you find a breach by Power Engineering Co. of the
implied warranty of fitness for its intended purpose of the
design of the motor generator unit plaintiff was testing when
he was injured?
-YES NO
4(b). Do you find a breach by Power Engineering Co. of the
implied warranty of fitness for their intended purpose of the
warnings provided with the motor generator unit plaintiff was
testing when he was injured?
YES NO
IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO BOTH 4(a) AND 4(b), SKIP TO
QUESTION 5. OTHERWISE, READ THE INSTRUCTIONS
FOR 4(c), 4(d), 4(e), AND 4(f).
ANSWER 4(c) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO 4(a).
4(c). Did plaintiff know of the defect in the motor gener-
ator's design, was he also aware of the danger arising from the
defect, and did he nevertheless proceed unreasonably with his
testing of the motor generator unit on the date of his injury?
YES NO
ANSWER 4(d) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO 4(b).
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4(d). Did plaintiff know of the defect in warnings, was he
also aware of the danger arising from the defect, and did he
nevertheless proceed unreasonably with his testing of the
motor generator unit on the date of his injury?
-YES NO
ANSWER 4(e) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO 4(c).
4(e). Was Power Engineering Co.'s breach of warranty as
to design a proximate cause of the injury?
-YES NO
ANSWER 4(f) ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO 4(d).
4(f). Was Power Engineering Co.'s breach of warranty as
to warnings a proximate cause of the injury?
-YES NO
[In this case the plaintiff makes a claim that he is entitled
to the benefit of the implied warranty of fitness. The marketer
of a product makes a warranty that the product will be fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such products are used. This
warranty is implied in law, whether or not it is expressed.]
[A marketer has a duty to market products that are fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such products are used and
thus free of defects. Whether a product is "fit" and free of
defects depends in part on the reasonable expectations of users
of the product.]
[The liability of a defendant for breach of warranty does not
depend, however, on any proof of negligence or lack of care on
the part of the defendant. To show a breach of warranty,
plaintiff need only prove that the product was, when sold,
defective in a way that made it unreasonably dangerous to the
user and thus did not conform to the warranty.]
[To make these points clear I will add some more explanation
now. The answer to Question 4(a) has to be YES if you an-
swered YES to either Question 1(a) or Question 2(a), or YES
to both Question 1(a) and Question 2(a). The reason for this is
that, in cases such as this, proof of negligence (in design,
instructions, or warning) that causes an injury also proves a
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breach of warranty. It is also true, however, that a breach of
warranty may be proved without proof of negligence.]
[Now I turn to some additional points. The mere fact that an
accident occurred in this case is not by itself evidence that the
product was defective. The defendant was not obliged to design.
the safest possible product. Warranty liability is not absolute
liability and the marketer of a product is not obliged to make
its product entirely accident-proof.]
[The test for whether a product is defective is not perfection
but rather that it not be unreasonably dangerous. A product
is not defective if it is safe for any foreseeable usage and
handling, including being safe for all foreseeable misuses and
foreseeable unintended uses.]
[Under the law of implied warranty, a product is defective
even if it is properly manufactured according to design, if the
design is itself unreasonably dangerous.]
Comment: Should 'unreasonably dangerous" be more precisely
defined by a "COST-BENEFIT," "RISK-UTILITY," or "BUR-
DEN < PL" comparison, or in some other way? If so, the sug-
gested formulation stated in Part III of this Article, or some
alternative the trial judge concludes is compatible with the state
tort law that is applicable, may be inserted here.
[A product is also defective if, when marketed, it fails to
provide reasonably adequate instructions for use. It is also
defective if the marketer fails to provide reasonably adequate
warnings of reasonably foreseeable dangers created by the
product.]
[Under law, the adequacy of a warning is measured by the
warning that would be given at the time of marketing by an
ordinarily prudent marketer. An ordinarily prudent marketer
is one who, at the time of the marketing, is fully aware of the
risks presented by the product. A defendant marketer of the
product is held to that standard regardless of the knowledge
of risks that the defendant actually had or reasonably should
have had when the marketing took place. The marketer is
presumed to have been fully informed at the time of the
marketing of all risks. The state of the art is irrelevant, as is
the culpability of the defendant. A product that, from the user's
perspective, is unreasonably dangerous due to lack of adequate
warnings, is defective and not fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such products are used, regardless of the absence of fault
of the marketer of the product.]
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[As to claims for breach of warranty, contributory negligence
(as I defined it in explaining Question 3) is not a defense under
applicable law. Therefore, I have not asked you about contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff in relation to Question 4.]
Comment: The next segment applies only in Massachusetts.
This is the Correia defense referred to in Part III of this article.
[As part (c) of Question 4 indicates, however, there is one
particular kind of conduct of a plaintiff that defeats a claim for
breach of warranty. I will now instruct you on this point. If the
product had a defect that made it unreasonably dangerous, and
the plaintiff knew of the defect and was aware of its danger,
and he nevertheless proceeded unreasonably to make use of the
product and was injured by it, his breach of warranty claim
fails.]
[You will note that part (c) of Question 4 uses the phrases
"know of the defect(s) in design and warnings" and "aware of
the danger arising from the defect(s)." These two phrases refer
to the state of mind of "knowing" and being "aware."]
[You may consider all the evidence before you, including
circumstantial evidence of what a reasonable person in his
position would have known and been aware of. The question
put to you, however, is not whether he should have known and
been aware, or whether a reasonable person in his position
would have known and been aware. The question put to you
is whether he did know and was aware.]
[You will note that part (c) of Question 4 also asks "did he
nevertheless proceed unreasonably" to use the product. "Un-
reasonably" is used here in the usual sense, requiring you to
consider whether he acted differently from the way an ordi-
narily prudent person would have acted in his circumstances.
Thus, in this respect the standard is not what his state of mind
was but instead whether his conduct in proceeding to use the
product was unreasonable conduct as judged by you, using the
standard of ordinary care and taking into account all the
circumstances in evidence.]
[The defendant has the burden of proof on part (c) of Ques-
tion 4. Thus if you find by a preponderance of the evidence,
first, that the plaintiff did know of the defect(s) of the product,
second, that plaintiff was aware of the danger arising from the
defect(s), and, third, that plaintiff did act unreasonably in
proceeding to use the product, you will answer YES to part (c).
Otherwise, you will answer NO to part (c).]
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[Now I turn to parts (d) and (e) of Question 4. You will not
answer either part (d) or part (e) of Question 4 unless you
answer NO to part (c).1
[Also, you will not answer part (d) if you answer NO to part
(a), and you will not answer part (e) if you answer NO to
part (b). In order to recover for breach of the implied warranty
of fitness, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the product
was defective and unreasonably dangerous, and that the defect
proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.]
[The instructions I have previously given to you on proximate
cause apply to that term as it is used in parts (d) and (e) of
Question 4.1
[The burden of proof on parts (d) and (e) of Question 4, as
well as on parts (a) and (b) of Question 4, is on the plaintiff.
If you find that plaintiff has met that burden of proof you will
answer YES. Otherwise, you will answer NO.]
Comment: The next Questions are Questions 1 and 2 from
Form 3.
Verdict Form Three
1(a). Did the motor generator unit plaintiff was testing at
the time of his injury have a defect of design?
-YES -NO
1(b). If YES, was the defect of design a proximate cause
of the injury?
-YES NO
Comment: The instructions on defect and proximate cause
may be quite similar to those presented above for use with
Verdict Forms One and Two, but the trial judge will be faced
with a hard choice involving unanswered questions of law,
depending on how the Restatement Third is interpreted. I do
not propose answers here to all those unanswered questions,
and for that reason do not present alternative drafting of these
segments of the charge for a "functional submission" of the kind
the Restatement Third recommends.
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DAMAGES
Comment: The next segment of the charge concerns Damages.
Question 5 of Form One is inserted here as a reminder of its
text. With Question 5 of Form Two, the reference to warranty
should be dropped, and the references to negligence as well
should be dropped in the question on damages and accompany-
ing instructions if Form Three is used. Question 3 of Verdict
Form Three omits references to negligence and warranty, and
substitutes "products liability" for "strict liability" and breach
of warranty. Otherwise, it is similar to Question 5 immediately
below, and the appropriate accompanying instructions are also
similar.
Verdict Form One
5. What amount of money would fairly and reasonably
compensate plaintiff Greer in full for the harms or losses, if
any, of each of the following types, that you find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence were proximately caused by the neg-
ligence or breach of warranty of Power Engineering Co.? Your
answers to questions (a), (b), (c), and (d) are to be stated in
terms of discounted value as of [the date this
civil action was filed].
This question concerns the amount required for fair and
reasonable compensation in full. Do not reduce your findings
because of a percentage of negligence, if any, you have found
in answering Question 3.
ECONOMIC DAMAGES:
(a) Loss of earning capacity,
if any, up to the date of
your verdict $
(b) Loss of earning capacity,
if any, in the future $
(c) Reasonable and necessary
expenses of treatment, if
any, up to the date of
your verdict $
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(d) Reasonable and necessary
expenses of treatment, if
any, in the future $
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
(e) Noneconomic damages, if
any, for physical injury,
pain and suffering, and
emotional distress, whether in
the past or in the future $
The mere fact that I instruct you on damages does not mean
that you must find damages. Also, the mere fact that I instruct
you on a particular type of damages does not mean that you
must find damages of that type. I am required to give you a
complete set of instructions as to the law.
Damages must be reasonable, fair, and just. If you find that
the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, you may award only such
damages as will reasonably compensate for the types of injuries
that are defined in these instructions, and only for the ele-
ments of damages of any type that you find, from a preponder-
ance of the evidence, were proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence, if any, or breach of warranty, if any.
The object of compensation allowed by law is to award the
equivalent in money to the plaintiff for the past, present and
future harm or loss he has sustained. This amount will be the
only amount the plaintiff will ever be able to recover from the
defendant, now or in the future.
I will now instruct you on the types of harms or losses for
which you may award damages if you find that they have been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence to have been proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's negligence or breach of
warranty.
In answering each separate question, you must award only
the amount needed to compensate the plaintiff fairly and
reasonably for the specific harm or loss. That is, you must not
award duplicative or overlapping amounts. Your total verdict
is the sum of your separate findings.
If you find that the plaintiff has not proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence any damages of the type asked about in
a particular part of a question, you will write NONE in that
blank.
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Loss of earning capacity, referred to in Questions 5(a) and
5(b), is not the same as loss of wages. Loss of earning capacity
is the loss or reduction of one's ability to secure and fulfill
gainful employment. Evidence of lost wages for a given period
of time can be considered as evidence of the scope and extent
of lost earning capacity during that period of time. But other
evidence may also be considered. If you find that negligence or
breach of warranty by the defendant was a proximate cause of
plaintiffs suffering a loss or reduction of his earning capacity
-that is, of his ability to secure certain kinds of employ-
ment-you may and should award him compensation for that
loss through whatever period of time you find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence it has extended or will extend.
You may consider as evidence on the subject of reduced
earning capacity what the plaintiff earned in some earlier
period of time, but you may not include in your answer to parts
5(a) and 5(b) any amount to compensate him for actual lost
wages or earnings. As I have explained, evidence of wage loss
or earnings loss is evidence you may consider but it is not the
measure of damages for the periods of time asked about in
parts 5(a) and 5(b).
If you award any amount for reduced earning capacity in the
future, beyond the date of your verdict, in answering part 5(b),
you should take into account not only the plaintiffs life expec-
tancy but also the length of time you think he would have been
employable in light of his condition and circumstances as you
find them to have been before the accident.
Any amount you award for future losses, in answer to
part 5(b), should be reduced to reflect the discounted value of
that future loss as of the date
Comment: The phrases in brackets below fit the statutory law
of Massachusetts.
[this civil action was filed.]
One reason for discounting is that an award of damages for
loss to be incurred in the future necessarily requires that
payment be made ahead of time for a loss that will not actually
be sustained until some future date. A second reason is that
any judgment for money damages entered in this case will bear
postjudgment interest from the date of the judgment until it
is paid.
Note that you are to discount the value as of [the date this
civil action was filed.] The reason for using that date is that
the clerk of this court will calculate the prejudgment interest
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at a statutory rate or rates [from the date the action was filed
up to the date the judgment is entered,] and will add that
amount to your findings in calculating the amount of the
judgment to be entered.
Under these circumstances, if you find for the plaintiff on the
element of future loss of earning capacity, the plaintiff will to
some extent be reimbursed in advance of loss, and so will have
the use of money that but for the accident and these proceed-
ings he would not have received until a later date.
Thus, in order to make a reasonable adjustment for the value
of the use of money representing a lump sum payment for
anticipated future loss, the law requires that you determine the
discounted worth of the anticipated future loss. This determi-
nation of discounted worth of a future loss can be difficult
because it may depend on inflation and on interest and dis-
count rates in ways that can be quite complex.
Comment: The following segment of the charge is appropriate
only if the parties so stipulate, or the applicable law allows the
trial judge to give this much guidance to the jury rather than
allowing them to hear conflicting expert testimony and use it to
make their finding.
[Experience tells us, however, that as an average through
many years, generally the interest one may earn by safe and
prudent investment of a lump sum of money exceeds inflation
by some percentage. It is for you to determine what percentage
you should use. For illustration only, if one applies a 2% rate
to an anticipated $100 loss one year after the date to which the
award is to be discounted (the "discount date"), the worth on
the discount date is 2% less than $100-that is, $98. Similarly,
the worth on the discount date of a $100 loss two years after
the discount date would be 2% less than $98-that is, a few
cents over $96.]
The instructions I have given you about discounting to value
as of the date this civil action was filed apply also to parts 5(c)
and 5(d).
As to part 5(e), these instructions about discounting do not
apply because your finding cannot be based on calculation in
any event. Your finding is to be what you determine to be fair
and reasonable. The clerk will add interest on this finding also,
at the statutory rate from the date on which this action was
filed, in determining the amount of the judgment to be entered.
Another type of damages is "noneconomic" damages, about
which Question 5(e) inquires. The phrase "noneconomic
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damages" means damages other than those related to economic
losses, which we have referred to as loss of earning capacity
and expenses of treatment. Included in "noneconomic damages"
are damages for past and future pain and suffering, including
any embarrassment or humiliation, or loss of enjoyment of life.
The plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for all past and
future mental and physical pain and suffering, humiliation, or
embarrassment, or loss of enjoyment of life that you find was
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence or by breach
of warranty.
Included in elements of noneconomic damages is compensa-
tion for noneconomic consequences of any physical injuries
proved by a preponderance of the evidence to have been prox-
imately caused by the defendant's negligence or breach of
warranty. This type of damages includes compensation for any
loss of bodily function proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. If you find that the defendant's negligence or breach of
warranty proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer physical
injuries or any loss of bodily function for some period of time,
you may, and should, compensate him for the full duration of
any such physical injury and any such loss of function proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's negligence or breach of
warranty. If you find some element of noneconomic harm to be
permanent, then you may and should allow damages for that
element of harm for its permanent duration, taking into
account the plaintiffs life expectancy.
The following instructions apply to all parts of Question 5.
When considering what the plaintiff must show in order to
be awarded full, fair and reasonable damages, for a type of
loss, bear in mind that recovery will not be barred because
there may be a lack of certainty in the plaintiffs proof of
aspects of loss that by their nature are not susceptible to
precise calculation. Under applicable law, much can and must
be left to the judgment and estimate of the jury, as long as it
is a reasoned determination based on evidence. The jury's
finding, however, is not to be made by speculation but instead
must be a reasonable finding based on reasonable inferences
from evidence. It is sufficient if the extent of the harm or loss
is shown by circumstantial evidence and is determined by just
and reasonable inference.
You should also keep in mind that you may only award
damages attributable to injuries proximately caused by de-
fendant's negligence or breach of warranty contributing to the
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accident of [date]. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that
claimed losses and harms, including noneconomic damages,
were proximately caused by the defendant's negligence or
breach of warranty.
Another matter you are to bear in mind is a rule of law that
is described either as a duty to mitigate, or as a rule of avoid-
able consequences. This rule of law says that a person who has
been injured as a result of someone else's negligence or breach
of warranty has a duty to use reasonable means to mitigate or
minimize his losses. In other words, a plaintiff who causes his
losses to be unnecessarily great by failing to act reasonably
cannot recover for the avoidable part of the losses.
If you find that, since the accident, the plaintiff has acted
unreasonably in a way that has needlessly increased his losses
or disability, you must exclude that needless increase from any
award of damages.
You should not concern yourselves with taxes in calculating
damages. No part of your award, or of the interest on your
award until the present time, is subject to any federal or state
taxes. Once an award is paid, however, if part of that sum is
invested by the plaintiff, then the interest or other investment
return the plaintiff receives in the future from that investment




When you go to the jury room to begin considering the
evidence in this case, I suggest that you first select one of the
members of the jury to act as your foreperson. The foreperson
will assure that every juror is present during all of your
deliberations and that all jurors, the foreperson included, will
have equal and full opportunity to participate in the delibera-
tions. Once you are in the jury room, if you need to communi-
cate with me, the foreperson will send a written message to
me. Do not tell me, however, how you stand, either numerically
or otherwise, on any issue before you, until after you have
reached a verdict.
On matters touching simply on the arrangements for your
meals, schedule, accommodations and convenience, you are free
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to communicate with the marshal orally rather than in writing.
You are not to communicate with anyone but me about the
case, however, and then only in writing.
I have read to you what is called the verdict form. A verdict
form is simply the written notice of the decision that you reach.
You will have the original and copies of this form in the jury
room and, when you have reached your verdict, your foreperson
will fill in, date, and sign the original to state the verdict upon
which you agree. Then you will return with your verdict to the
courtroom. Your verdict must be unanimous. That is, you must
be unanimous as to the answer to each of the questions you
answer.
It is my usual practice, absent special circumstances, to allow
a jury at a time the jury chooses between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. to
recess and begin deliberations again the morning of the next
regular court day (that is, not including Saturday, Sunday, and
holidays), or else, if the jurors prefer, to have food brought in
and continue deliberations into the evening, but not later than
9:30 or 10 p.m. You may ask the marshal to report your prefer-
ence to me. If you wish to continue deliberations into the
evening, the marshal will need advance notice of at least two
hours as to when you will wish to have food brought in.
It is not yet time for you to start deliberating. I will ask you
to go to the jury room and remain at ease for a few minutes.
I still have some more brief instructions to give you before it
will be time for you to deliberate.
Comment: After objections and requests have been heard, and
rulings have been made, if any objections or requests are
sustained, appropriate additional instructions or modifications
of instructions are made before proceeding with the closing
instructions, below.
Members of the jury, it is now time for the case to be sub-
mitted to you. The first thing you should do is select one of the
members of the jury to act as your foreperson. Then, you may
commence your deliberations. All of you must be together at
all times when you are deliberating. Whenever you need a re-
cess for any purpose, your foreperson may declare a recess. Do
not discuss the case during a recess in your deliberations. All
of your discussion of the case should occur only when you are
in the jury room, all together, and your foreperson has indi-
cated that deliberations may proceed. This should be your
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procedure so that everyone in the jury will have equal opportu-
nity to participate and to hear all that other members of the
jury say.
You may go to the jury room and then may commence your
deliberations as soon as you have selected your foreperson.
CONCLUSION
The University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform deserves
our applause and appreciation for convening the conference of
March 1996 and developing this Symposium. The ultimate
benefits of their initiative will depend on continued efforts of
all who read these papers to advance understanding of the
issues considered, including the special problems associated
with the extraordinary complex of mixed-legal-policy-factual
issues that products liability cases present.
